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This argument takes the form: God has all possible features. Existence is good, therefore God has it, and therefore He exists. One can notice at first glance that this is a cyclical argument (what the logician might characterize as arguing in circles, or begging the question) because it introduces the idea it wishes to prove (the existence of God) as an integral component of the primary premise of the argument (God has all possible features). In attempting to prove the existence of God, it assumes the existence of God... To reiterate: While the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God is supposed to be an argument for the existence of God, its major premise, or reason, (God has all possible features) already assumes the existence of God, so that the conclusion, although drawn through a valid inference, merely reaffirms—rather than establish—the premise. The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God, rightly then, is not a valid argument for the existence of God. It is but an attempt at affirming an existing belief in the existence of God. 20 July 2003 PostscriptIf indeed God has all possible features, then shouldn't he have bad as well as good features? Or are "bad features" implicitly precluded from Aquinas' definition of "all possible features"? |