Aquinas’ Argument for the Goodness of God

This argument, succinctly, is that:

Everything has some goodness, and the cause of each thing is better than the thing caused. Therefore the first cause is the best thing possible.

First, this argument assumes that the argument for a first cause is sound. We have already discussed that argument’s flaw, and have established it to be unsound in that it fails to meet the validity of inference condition for the soundness of an argument.

Second, and importantly, Aquinas’ Argument for the goodness of God draws on premises (or reasons) that are not absolute truths (recall that the first condition for the soundness of an argument is the premises--or reasons--that form the foundation of the argument must be true).

1. Aquinas’ first premise is that everything has some goodness… Does everything really have some goodness?
2. His second premise is that the cause of everything is better than the thing caused… Is it really inconceivable for an effect to be better than its cause?

Aquinas’ Argument for the Goodness of God, therefore, falters for two reasons:

1. It assumes that the argument for first cause is sound – and we have shown the argument not to be.
2. It fails to meet the validity of inference condition for soundness of an argument.

20 July 2003