On Values: Subjective or Objective?

Value, according to Living Issues in Philosophy, has several overlapping meanings. A value could be:

• A guiding principle, such as honesty
• A quality, such as persistence
• A goal, such as happiness
• The monetary or artistic worth of something

The debate between the subjectivist and the objectivist is as to whether value emanate from within us, or are inherent in objects in the universe. In other words, does an object become valuable because I desire it, or do I desire it because it is valuable?

The subjectivist holds that value emanate from within the individual -- when we desire an object, it becomes valuable. The objectivist maintains, contrarily, that values exist independently in objects and that our appreciation of value is because they call forth our “moral sense” or “aesthetic faculty.”

While the subjectivist argues that if I appreciate a painting or desire truth, I immediately bestow value on those objects, the objectivist believes value already exists in the painting and in truth; it is this value that evokes my aesthetic faculty (with respect to the painting) or my moral sense (with respect to truth).

One question to consider when pondering the subjectivity or objectivity of value is: do values express knowledge or feelings? For instance, when I say Mona Lisa is beautiful, am I making an absolute (objective) assertion or am I expressing a (subjective) opinion? It would appear that the statement is rather an opinion than an assertion. Let us call this kind of opinion a value judgement. Value judgements are subjective in that they are neither absolute nor irrevocable.

But are values subjective?

George Santayana, a renowned subjectivist contends that, “there is no value apart from some appreciation of it.” For him, nothing has intrinsic value until somebody actually appreciates it. The objectivist would be quick to ask: what is it that a person appreciates in an object, if there is no value in the object? The objectivist might argue further that we cannot appreciate value if it does not already exist independent of us.

Dewitt H. Parker, another subjectivist, maintains that, “the satisfaction of desire is the real value.” Again, the objectivist might be tempted to ask, would it be a value to steal or kill to satisfy ones desire?

Parker underscores Santayana’s position in his article in The Saturday Review. He argued that when our aesthetic faculty is evoked (by, say, a painting), our joy comes as a sense of the painting’s beauty, not as a sense of pleasure. The good feeling we get from the painting is translated into value (the painting’s beauty). He continues that the real joy of our aesthetic experience is our sense of pleasure, not the sense of the object’s beauty. In other words the real value of the painting is the pleasure the observer derives from looking at it -- only that his aesthetic awareness is made manifest in his sense of its beauty, and not in his feeling of pleasure. Parker's argument ties value to the feeling of pleasure, the feeling of pleasure being the aftermath of an aesthetic experience.

My criticism of this position is that it does not offer an explanation for a situation where one perceives beauty, but is overcome not by a feeling of pleasure, but by such, say, jealousy. If two people were presented with the same painting at the same time, and one were to appreciate it while the other seethed with jealously, would could be said of the painting with regard to value or the lack thereof? The complication for the subjectivist position here is that one person , the one who appreciates the painting, (supposedly) imbues it with value, while the other, the one who is seized by jealousy, denies it of value. The state of affairs in which the painting is at once imbued with, and denied of value, is, one must agree, a rather disconcerting one.

The most belabored subjectivist argument, perhaps, is that values are experiences, never things or objects; that things may be valuable, but are not values; and that we project value into the external world, attributing to it the things we desire.

First, things are not valuable because we desire them, but rather, we desire them because they are valuable. In this sense, value precedes desire; values exist in objects before our awareness and appreciation of them. It is intrinsic value that evokes the oft-mentioned moral sense and aesthetic faculty; and if value is agreed to precede desire (or appreciation), our appreciation of an object cannot bestows value on the object.

Yet another argument for subjectivity of values is that judgments of goodness and beauty have varied from individual to individual, from group to group, and from one age to another; that if values were wholly objective, judgments will not vary. Yes, judgments vary from individual to individual, group to group and age to age, but this is so because different individuals or groups perceive objects’ intrinsic value differently. These differences in perception, not a subjectivity of values, account for the differences in value judgments.

Conclusively, while values are mostly objective, they also have subjective corollary. Values are related to our feelings, preferences and desires in that we prefer and desire things that have value (the subjective aspect). However, it is our appreciation of values which exist in the object (the objective aspect) that is of greater consequence. For the authors of Living Issues in Philosophy, a value is objective if its nature and existence is independent of a subject; most values are. The interlocking nature of subjectivity and objectivity is such that real value emerges when there is a synthesis of subjectivism and objectivism.

So, do you think values are mostly subjective or mostly objective? I'd like to know.

Work Cited:
Titus, Smith & Nolan, Living Issues in Philosophy, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1995.

Originally written for an Assignment in Dr. Bob Lichtenbert's Philosophy 106.